Last week, Foreign Affairs editor Gideon Rose interviewed Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Stephen Biddle on all things Afghanistan. 
 
 
Here's part of the exchange on how the U.S. would know if it's successful, which takes at least "a whole fighting season and a winter," according to Biddle.
ROSE: So what I hear you saying is that you have a Potter Stewart 
definition of success, but not a Potter Stewart definition of failure. 
In other words, if it is working you'll see the levels of violence come 
down at some point. You'll see things start to stabilize and then you'll
 know things are going well. But if that hasn't happened yet, it is hard
 to distinguish between "It may happen down the road" and "It's not 
going to happen."
BIDDLE: Yeah. And eventually, there's a statute of limitations on 
this. I mean, you can't reasonably expect after five or six years to 
keep saying, "Well, it'll happen eventually." Again, I think about a 
year to 18 months is a reasonable time frame. You have to live through a
 whole fighting cycle.
ROSE: So, in effect, you are saying we should have some kind of 
mental clock ticking but we should have set it for when the new set of 
policies -- the Afghan surge -- essentially began?
BIDDLE: I think that's right. I also think we have to look at the 
details of the sequence of things that are happening, rather than just 
the aggregate casualty statistics -- especially at the national level.
If the model is working, if COIN is doing what it's supposed to do, a
 series of things should happen, more or less in this order: first you 
clear the bad guys out, then the bad guys are going to try and 
counterattack. You have to expect that and resist it. The counterattacks
 eventually tail off and then you have to build up governance. So 
there's a series of things that happen.
What I'm advocating in assessing the situation in Afghanistan is that
 we do it in a much more disaggregated way. We don't look at whether 
July is the largest casualty month in the history of the war at that 
national level. That doesn't tell us much. You've got to look at 
particular places in terms of their own natural history. When did the 
operation start there? At what part of the process should you reasonable
 expect a place like Nawa, as opposed to a place like Marjah, to be? And
 is what you're seeing consistent with what you would expect for this 
moment in the natural history of that place?
In Marjah, I think you could reasonably expect that we're right smack
 in the middle of the first major fighting season since the United 
States showed up. And this is counterattack time. I think that's 
basically what we're seeing. It is a really bad sign if we're still 
seeing the same thing next July in Marjah.
Read the full transcript here. 
			 
		
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