Think Tanked

CSIS' Cordesman Publishes New Afghanistan Report

The Center for Strategic and International Studies released a new 223 page report by Anthony Cordesman, “Afghan National Security Forces: What It Will Take to Implement the ISAF Strategy.”

From the release:

President Obama’s new strategy for Afghanistan is critically dependent upon the transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). His speech announcing this strategy called for the transfer to begin in mid-2011. However, creating the Afghan forces needed to bring about security and stability is a far more difficult problem than many realize, and poses major challenges that will endure long after 2011.

A successful effort to create effective Afghan forces, particularly forces that can largely replace the role of US and allied forces, must overcome a legacy of more than eight years of critical failures in both force development and training, and in the broader course of the US effort in Afghanistan. Such an effort must also be shaped as part of an integrated civil-military effort, and not treated simply as an exercise in generating more Afghan military and police forces.

Success will be equally dependent on strategic patience. There is a significant probability that the ANSF will not be ready for any major transfer of responsibility until well after 2011. Trying to expand Afghan forces too quickly, creating forces with inadequate force quality, and decoupling Afghan force development from efforts to deal with the broad weaknesses in Afghan governance and the Afghan justice system, will lose the war. America’s politicians, policymakers, and military leaders must accept this reality—and persuade the Afghan government and our allies to act accordingly—or the mission in Afghanistan cannot succeed.

This analysis shows that the US and ISAF have made major progress in many areas since the new strategy was adopted in 2009. At the same time, it indicates that past mistakes and under-resourcing have left a legacy that will take time to overcome. ANSF development is still a high-risk effort, and one where imposing artificial deadlines, and emphasizing force quantity over force quality, could lose the war.

Moreover, it shows that there are critical strategic disconnects between the overall ANSF force development effort and both civil-military operations and an effective approach to transferring responsibility to Afghan forces. These problems are potentially crippling in the case of the Afghan police forces – where the current plan does not call for adequate paramilitary elements and seeks to develop an overall level of police capabilities that are not matched to Afghan capabilities, effective governance, or the other elements of a justice system.

There are a wide range of areas where the current force development effort needs more outside help and strategic patience, and the study outlines possible improvements. It suggests that a zero-based recommendation may be needed for the police effort to examine both the need for more paramilitary forces and to determine a credible approach to integrating police development with the progress that can actually be made in governance and the rule of law.

More generally, it outlines a series of improvements that need to be made in fighting corruption, in improving partnership, and in conducting the force development effort. This includes setting more realistic deadlines, providing all of the necessary resources in both funds and trainers, and focusing on creating a force with enduring capability that can actually accept responsibility as the US and its allies gradually withdraw their forces.

Download the full report here.

RAND Study Rates 20 Counterinsurgency Strategies

According to a RAND Corporation release today, a major new, 178-page study rates the performance of 20 distinct approaches to counterinsurgency operations against 30 recent insurgencies around the globe between 1978 and 2008.

The project was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, Irregular Warfare Division.

From the release:

"Too much of the current debate on counterinsurgency relies on one or two arbitrarily selected cases or a general sense of history," said Christopher Paul, lead author of the study and a social scientist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. "This study used 30 systematically selected and analyzed cases to reach some findings that support the conventional wisdom, and some that are more surprising."

For example, winning a counterinsurgency campaign doesn't hinge on a single factor. The armed forces that succeed in counterinsurgency operations typically implement a host of identified good counterinsurgency practices while avoiding ineffective ones. More surprising, however, is that this finding holds across all 30 cases studied.

Every counterinsurgency "win"—eight out of 30 cases—had a strongly positive balance of successfully implemented good versus detrimental factors and every counterinsurgency loss had a zero or negative balance of good versus detrimental factors. Researchers say this suggests that while every insurgency may be unique in its specific context and local conditions, the kinds of things that counterinsurgents should be trying to do are consistent across cases.

Of the 20 counterinsurgency approaches tested, 13 received strong empirical support, while three approaches—resettlement, escalating repression and various insurgent support strategies—have the weight of evidence against them. Some of the counterinsurgency approaches validated by this study include those advocated in Army Field Manual 3-24 (Counterinsurgency). Those strategies include what would now be called strategic communication and several classic approaches to counterinsurgency, including pacification and legitimacy.

While some repressive counterinsurgency forces have managed to prevail, the study found that repression is a bad counterinsurgency practice. Only two of eight winning counterinsurgency campaigns (those in Turkey and Croatia) used escalating repression and collective punishment during the decisive phase of the conflict. However, in those two cases the counterinsurgents simultaneously employed a much larger number of good counterinsurgency practices.

Repression was shown to win intermediate phases, but a substantial majority of phases in which the counterinsurgents seized the upper hand through repression preceded an ultimate defeat, including insurgencies in Somalia, Burundi, Tajikistan and Kosovo.

Popular support was found to be an important contributor to insurgency outcomes. However, tangible support—the ability of insurgents to replenish and obtain personnel, materiel financing, intelligence and sanctuary—was found to be even more important than popular support.

While popular support and tangible support often followed each other in the cases studied —if the insurgents had the support of the population, they were able to meet their tangible support needs; if they lacked popular support, they were not—when popular support and tangible support diverged, victory followed tangible support. Because of this, the study recommends counterinsurgents identify the specific tangible support needs and sources of insurgents and target them in addition to wooing the population in the area of conflict.

The study recommends that counterinsurgency operations should plan to pursue multiple, mutually supporting lines of operation, and build and maintain forces capable of engaging in multifaceted operations.

Several of the good counterinsurgency practices depend on the nature and behavior of the host nation government, so if a government or its structure or policies do not conform with good counterinsurgency practices, improvement should be a top priority. Also, the United States "should think twice before choosing to support governments that will not help themselves," Paul said.

While there is no hard and fast threshold for the minimum number of good counterinsurgency practices a force must use in order to win, counterinsurgents should keep a scorecard of good versus bad factors and practices. If the balance of good and bad factors is not positive, that suggests counterinsurgents should adjust strategies or make changes in their implementation or execution.

Petraeus Cancels for Tonight's Hudson Award Ceremony

After yesterday's announcement that General David Petraeus will take over (assuming confirmation) for ousted General Stanley McChrystal, all speaking Petraeus engagements have been canceled. 

That includes tonight's appearance in New York at a Hudson Institute dinner to receive the 2010 James H. Doolittle Prize.

In a note from Hudson:

We are pleased however, to inform you that the dinner will proceed to celebrate the awarding of the prize to the General, which will be accepted on his behalf by his former Executive Officer and friend, Colonel Mike Iverson.

The distinguished guest speakers at the dinner will be H.E. Ambassador Husain Haqqani, Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States, and The Honorable Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner of the New York City Police Department.

We look forward to celebrating this award with you and joining together to recognize, at this most critical time for our country at war, the courage, patriotism and sense of duty that General David H. Petraeus personifies.

This is the second recent conservative think tank award for Petraeus. Last month, AEI presented Petraeus with the 2010 Irving Kristol Award.

NAF's Steve Clemons on Maddow Discussing McChrystal

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Two Think Tanks on McChrystal

In a piece over at Stars and Stripes, Leo Shane captures the reactions of two very different think tanks.

Daniel Goure, vice president of the Lexington Institute:

“To put anyone else in charge right now would be a disaster,” Goure said.

Goure said the Rolling Stone article doesn’t quite amount to a Truman/MacArthur moment, when Gen. Douglas MacArthur was sacked over his public opposition to President Harry Truman’s strategy in the Korean War. The most damning comments in the article come from McChrystal’s advisers, Goure noted, and at least one of those staffers has already been fired for his involvement with the piece.

Regardless, Goure said, no other American figure has the clout with Afghan president Hamid Karzai or the knowledge of the counterinsurgency strategy to succeed in Afghanistan.

And Brian Katulis at the Center for American Progress:

Brian Katulis, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, said the article could easily be used as Taliban propaganda, revealing infighting among U.S. leaders and a lack of real concern for the Afghan people.

“He’s supposed to be leading efforts to win the hearts and minds over there,” Katulis said. “This article doesn’t help.”

Feulner Issues Heritage Statement on Afghanistan

Amid the turmoil in the Obama administration surrounding the Rolling Stone article on McChrystal, Heritage Foundation President Ed Feulner just released a statement on the war in Afghanistan on behalf of the entire organization.

The artificial Afghanistan withdrawal deadline has obviously caused some of our military leaders to question our strategy in Afghanistan.

That deadline, which President Barack Obama announced to the American people, the military, our allies and our enemies on December 1, 2009, has provoked many — including the government in Kabul, the Afghan people, the military in Pakistan, and our enemies the terrorists  – to question America’s resolve to win the War in Afghanistan.

More disconcerting for the American people is that the timeline appears to be putting tremendous unnecessary pressure on our armed forces to accomplish their task: victory on the ground.

We don’t need an artificial timeline for withdrawal. We need a strategy for victory.

Though the president can’t pretend he never set a timeline, he can now exercise his authority as commander in chief to make things right.

He should start by eliminating the timeline and making it clear that winning the war is his top priority. He can do that by giving our military leaders whatever additional forces or resources they need to get the job done.

Together with Afghan forces and NATO, the United States must weaken the Taliban on the battlefield before engaging in serious negotiations with Taliban members who break ties with al-Qaeda. And the president must press Pakistan to deal firmly and unambiguously with all terrorists.

Now is the time for President Obama to recognize that his artificial timeline has had very real consequences. The president must right the ship, change course on his strategy, and make it clear to friend and foe that he is committed to victory in Afghanistan.

AEI's Marc Thiessen Calls Afghanistan Surge a Failure

Yesterday, former Bush speechwriter and AEI fellow Marc Thiessen, in a post called "Wonder Why the Surge is Failing?" wrote:

What the Obama administration does not seem to appreciate is that the reason its surge is not working, while the surge in Iraq did, is because President Bush refused to set a artificial deadline for withdrawal. So when American commanders on the ground promised Iraqi tribes we would stick with them if they joined us in the fight, their word was credible. Iraqis had confidence that we would see the job through to the end, and not abandon their country to the enemy. Today, Afghans have no such confidence in America. The vice president has sent a message that has resonated from Kabul to Kandahar that America can’t wait to leave. And no effort by Gates to walk those comments back will have much impact on Afghan perceptions on the ground.

Ultimately:

Biden deserves to be taken to the woodshed. But the ultimate responsibility for this debacle lies with his boss.

Heritage's Holmes: Cut All Spending Except Defense

Heritage Foundation Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies Kim Holmes argues that conservatives should fight their gut reaction to cut spending on all fronts.

But here’s the problem. The Obama administration is cutting defense projects and programs that we need, and doing so by using disingenuous arguments of frugality intended to put conservatives on the defensive. But conservatives should not be on the defensive. National defense is the one area of government that conservatives believe the federal government has a constitutional responsibility to do right. So much of Obama’s spending is unnecessary and of dubious constitutionality. That is not the case in spending on national defense.

The bottom line is that the Obama administration plans defense budget cuts that will weaken future necessary modernization and other programs. Under their plans, there is no way the U.S. can build the weapons and systems necessary to keep America safe in the coming decades. There are simply not enough “savings” in cutting “waste, fraud and abuse” in Obama’s defense budget to make up for his cuts in modernization and other programs.

Heritage Blog: Slow Down on Don't Ask, Don't Tell!

Chuck Donovan, Senior Research Fellow in The Heritage Foundation's DeVos Center for Religion and Civil Society, is arguing for a slowdown on repealing Don't Ask Don't Tell. 

Calling the new movement on Don't Ask, Don't Tell repeal announced this week a "new liberal power grab," Donovan is convinced it's all politics that will detrimental to the troops.

This crass political maneuver is an affront to the men and women in the military whose opinions matter, because they will be most affected by any change in the law. Regardless of what one thinks of full repeal—whatever it might mean in practice—lawmakers should wait until the ongoing survey of service personnel is completed and analyzed. Any legislative action now is premature, and a thumbing of the nose at the military.

The sleight-of-hand at work is the notion that since everyone already understands what repeal of the current law means, Congress might as well just repeal the law now. However, since the issues at stake involve not just neutral characteristics like race or national origin, but rather responses to a whole set of behaviors that may affect everything from military family policy to religious liberty, repeal of the military service eligibility law could take any number of forms. The range of implications is profound, from core issues of national security and military readiness, to recruitment and retention, to conduct standards and unit cohesion.

Instead, a debate should answer 10 questions Donovan lays out. Here are some of them:

3. What would be the impact of repeal on retention policies and results and recruitment policies and results?

4. What would be the impact of a full repeal on particular operational issues (e.g., fraternization, submarine service, field deployment, special forces, etc.)?

8. What would be the impact on service chaplains and counselors who may have specific denominational or personal views on the illicitness of same-sex conduct and same-sex relationships? Could they face punitive, administrative or remedial measures (e.g., sensitivity training) that impact their ability to perform their professional roles or infringe on their right to hold and express certain moral or religious views?

9. If military personnel express disagreement with changes to policy approving of homosexuality, how will that affect their careers?

10. Will homosexuality be considered a protected class for promotion or advancement purposes? Will the new law require that promotion boards include precept language requiring the promotion of homosexuals?

Brookings' Singer: More Military Robotic Experimentation

In a new Popular Mechanics article, Brookings' 21st Century Defense Initiative Director Peter W. Singer argues that rather than being too stagnant, or too sure of themselves, or too dogmatic, the U.S. military needs more experimentation in the robotic revolution to make sure they don't become the losers of the field they now dominate.

The answer then is not to turn back the clock on technologic change and cling to old systems or doctrines. Nor is it to leap before looking. Rather, now is the time to experiment, to play the field and be promiscuous with our technologic futures. Whether it's Apple and its i-Initiative or the interwar German Wehrmacht and the over 30 committees and wargames it set up after World War I to learn the lessons of how to best use the new technologies of tanks and airplanes, the winners in these technologic revolutions are consistently those who are studious, but flexible. They are willing to explore and embrace the new, but not commit themselves until they truly have a sense of the technology and the changes it represents.

For the U.S. military, it means we should focus less now on what the perfect robotic system will look like 20 or 30 years out, fighting for kids not born yet in battles we know not where. Instead, we should return to our own tradition of experimenting, pushing multiple design contests and encouraging vast testing of prototypes, so as to ensure that our current defense purchasing isn't pre-emptively deciding how we will fight in the future, but rather allows us to choose what will be best in that future. And if these winning designs don't come from the current leaders on the manufacturing side, so be it. Much as in the history of automobiles or computers the most innovative and perhaps ultimately effective ideas are just as likely to come from the risk-taking small companies as they are from the market behemoths.